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The following case study describes the circumstances that led to the launch of the Ichthys LNG 
Project in Australia, one of the largest in the natural gas industry. The case illustrates the most 
significant phases of the project’s development, from the initial conception to the final 
investment decision announced in January 2012 and the consequent financial close, reached 
after a complex project finance operation. The goal of the case study is to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the main features of the financing arranged and the mitigation 
techniques used to manage the risks associated with massive integrated gas projects. 
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The role of project finance in the natural gas industry:  
the Ichthys LNG Project 
Introduction 
“The Ichthys Final Investment Decision announced today by INPEX and Total signals the start 
of construction of one the world’s largest LNG facilities based on an estimated 40 years of gas 
and condensate reserves from the Browse Basin offshore Western Australia”.1 
Mr. Kuroda, INPEX chairman - January 13th, 2012 
With these words in mind, Mr. Seiya Ito, INPEX President Director in Australia and Head of 
the Ichthys Project Division, was drinking a cup of sakè and revising again all the details of the 
construction phase of the project. “Everything is ready for what turns out to be the biggest 
project of a Japanese company in Australia” – he thought. Few days before, the announcement 
of the Ichthys’ launch generated a lot of enthusiasm within the company and drew the attention 
of the energy sector. Mr. Ito knew that the progress towards the Final Investment Decision has 
proven to be challenging but he was also convinced that the Ichthys project represented a main 
pillar for the company’s long-term strategy and would contribute to meet Japan’s energy needs 
and to support the Australian economy, reinforcing important trade ties between the two 
countries.  
INPEX’s project was just one of the many approved in Australia in 2012. After a decade of 
intensive exploration activities and the discovery of more-than-forecasted gas fields, the 
country was now experiencing a wave of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects that would 
allow it to become one the biggest exporters of natural gas around the world.  
However, “Ichthys was special!” – Mr. Ito thought, because, among those projects, it was 
expected to contribute in a greater proportion to Australia’s raising exports and to strengthen 
its position in the global energy scenario. 
The Ichthys project, undertaken by a group of sponsors led by INPEX Corporation of Japan 
and Total SA of France, was considered the largest project ever financed through project 
financing and regarded as one of the most complex in the LNG industry, due to unprecedented 
engineering challenges in its development and construction, consisting of both offshore and 
onshore facilities and covering all the elements of the gas production chain. 
                                                 
1 http://www.inpex.com.au/media/1114/13_01_2012_final_investment_decision_on_ichthys_lng_project.pdf.  
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Given its size and complexity, the limited-recourse financing arranged for the project 
represented a significant milestone not only for the gas sector but also for the international 
finance markets, making Ichthys a new example to look at in project finance transactions.  
“But…Will everything work out as expected?” – Mr Ito asked himself.  
THE ASIA-PACIFIC ENERGY MARKET 
Australia: A new “energy superpower” 
The petroleum and gas industry in Australia experienced a rapid growth in the 90s and 2000s 
thanks to the government’s incentives to support finding and drilling operations. Indeed, 
Australia could count on a large amount of both conventional and unconventional gas reserves, 
with the latter mostly located in the Western Australia; estimates of reserves-to-production were 
believed to be in excess of 250 years and LNG was projected to be the country’s fastest growing 
fuel export over the next two decades.2 As of January 2009, the identified resources accounted 
for more than 10 trillion cubic metres, but there was still ample room for the discovery of further 
offshore gas fields. Exhibit 1 shows the long-term outlook for Australian gas supply-demand 
balance.  
Total natural gas production was around 50.4 billion cubic metres in 2010,3 registering a 
significant increase of unconventional gas production of 7% if compared to 2003. The rise in 
the production, for uses other than domestic consumption, drove LNG exports and contributed 
to expand the export production capacity of the country.   
The Australian domestic gas market was divided into three main geographically isolated 
regional markets (Exhibit 6): the Eastern Market, the Western Market and the Northern Market, 
with the first one being the largest consumer of gas within the country. Despite the high 
consumption levels, its contribution to gas’ production accounted for almost 35% of the total 
gas produced. Conversely, the Western Market’s rate of production outpaced the domestic 
consumption since 1989-90, allowing to raise the country’s exports of gas as LNG.  
The natural gas market’s expansion was favoured by the Australian Government’s energy 
policies aimed at encouraging and promoting further petroleum exploration in Australia’s 
offshore waters.4 Through the release of the annual Offshore Petroleum Acreage, the AUS 
                                                 
2 Source: Oil & Gas Financial Journal 
3 Source: International Energy Agency, 2011 
4 Source: Australian Department of Industry, Innovation and Science  
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Department of Energy used to conduct competitive biddings to grant exploration permits and 
petroleum rights for a wide range of coastal regions and national offshore areas. The design of 
an attractive framework for petroleum operations and the transparent regulatory requirements 
propelled foreign investments, that concurred to further develop the domestic gas market. 
Among the sedimentary basins of Australia, the Browse Basin, situated on the North-West 
Coast, was one of the richest in terms of petroleum reserves and one of the most actively 
explored since 1967. Drilling activities brought to light a significant amount of gas 
accumulations and oil fields that pushed energy companies to undertake large LNG projects.  
A “wave” of LNG projects in Australia 
The “golden age” of exploration activities in Australia represented the base for the proliferation 
of several projects aimed at developing world-scale LNG infrastructures. In 2011, more than 
50% of the biggest gas projects worldwide were located in Australia.5 Between 2009 and 2012, 
the Australian Government approved numerous upstream and downstream “mega” projects that 
were key to Australia’s future energy outlook. The spreading of such a large number of LNG 
investments was partially fostered by the rising contribution of gas production to the country’s 
energy mix and exports within the Asia-Pacific region. Along with it, the country suffered from 
a 16$ billion trade deficit in petroleum products, as a consequence of the reduced levels of oil 
production since 2000.6 Hence, negative prospects about the domestic market for crude oil 
prompted the Government to reconsider the potential for natural gas to become the new 
country’s fuel for its economy. On top of that, the stable political environment, the high level 
of fiscal stability and the low-risk profile of the country together contributed to further attract 
investments from foreign companies.  
Apart from favourable national conditions, LNG projects benefited from positive 
macroeconomic trends, mainly characterized by demand shifts towards lighter cleaner energy 
sources, such as natural gas, and decreasing construction costs that resulted in higher supply. 
The linkage to oil price sustained the growth in gas demand: by being traded at a discount to 
crude parity, rising demand led to inter-fuel substitution with the aim of reducing carbon 
emissions.7  
                                                 
5 Bernstein Research, 2013. “Australia Gas: Riding the Next LNG Wave”. 
6 Source: Oil & Gas Financial Journal 
7 Natural gas is considered to be a cleaner fuel source compared to oil, coal and other petroleum products. 
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In 2009-2010, five large LNG projects obtained the approval of the Australian government and 
took their final investment decision (Gordon LNG, Pluto LNG, Gorgon, Gladstone LNG and 
Queensland Curtis projects) and many others were already planned and about to announce their 
launch, such as the Bonaparte LNG project and Prelude Floating LNG project, operated by 
Shell. Exhibit 7 shows the location of the major gas projects in Australia in 2013.  
Given the high potential of these projects, LNG production levels were forecasted to increase 
by 500% to over 100 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) in the next ten years.  
The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster: What’s next for Japan? 
Australia was one of the biggest exporters of natural gas to Asian countries, such as Japan and 
China. Indeed, the lack of significant domestic reserves and the continued strong demand of 
energy sources made Japan a growing customer of Australian LNG. Given its limited 
endowment of natural resources, Japan’s dependency on LNG increased significantly in the last 
decade, making it the world’s largest LNG importer. As such, the country committed massive 
investments in regasification facilities: in 2012, Japan could count on the highest regasification 
capacity in the world, estimated to be at more than 150 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) 
(Exhibit 4).  
According to the AUS Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, in 2011, 73% of LNG 
exports were to Japan, and the projected increase in Australian production capacity could help 
Japan to further diversify its energy supply,8 especially after the tremendous nuclear disaster at 
Fukushima of the same year, caused by a tremendous tsunami and earthquake that resulted in a 
shutdown of 12,000 MW of electric generating capacity.9 Reduced availability of nuclear 
resources led the Government to pursue energy efficiency measures designed to compensate 
the loss of nuclear fuel with additional natural gas.  
The need for Australian LNG became urgent also because of the lack of supply-side 
alternatives: Indonesia, its major exporter in the last 20 years, experienced a steep decline in 
gas production, that coupled with increased domestic demand, resulted in calls for gas to be 
used for domestic supply rather than being exported. In addition, the majority of Japan’s long-
term purchase contracts with other gas exporting countries were about to expire. 
                                                 




THE ICHTHYS PROJECT: historical background 
The major sponsor: INPEX in Australia 
INPEX Corporation was Japan’s largest integrated energy company and the main national 
petroleum explorer and producer. Established in 1966 and headquartered in Tokyo, the 
company played a major role in sustaining the supply of energy to Japan, with natural gas as its 
core business. Its wide range of operations included more than 71 oil and gas projects around 
several regions of the world. Among them, Australia was considered to be vital to the 
company’s long-term growth and to reach its goal of meeting Japan’s increasing energy needs. 
To further diversify its business and consolidate its presence within the Asia-Pacific region, 
INPEX decided to commit huge capital investments mainly destined to enlarge its portfolio of 
activities in Australia in the latter half of the 80s. After acquiring more than a decade of 
experience collaborating with both international and domestic Engineering and Procurement 
(E&P) companies, INPEX established fruitful alliances and profitable partnerships and 
strengthened its participation in several Australian offshore projects, acting mainly as a joint 
venture partner.  
Mr. Ito, INPEX managing executive officer and member of the corporate board since 2008, 
believed that Australia was central to accomplish their mission of securing stable gas supply to 
Japan. “Our involvement in drilling operations within the Australian territory may allow us to 
reach high production targets” – he said to Mr. Kuroda in one of their meetings.  “From being 
a quiet achiever in Australian business, we need to move on and go one step forward in 
consolidating our presence in the country!”10 – he agreed with Mr. Ito, believing that INPEX 
should have taken advantage of the bids organized by the Australian government to promote 
petroleum exploration. Indeed, during the years of operations in Australia in the 90s, INPEX’s 
geological studies confirmed the presence of a large amount of gas and petroleum reserves in 
the Browse Basin. 
Following the release of the Annual offshore petroleum acreage in 1997, INPEX participated 
in an open tender to gain drilling permits for the WA-285-P acreage off Western Australia, that 
was considered to be the one with the greatest potential for gas resources. In August 1998, the 
bid culminated with the winning of an exploration license, with INPEX having a 100% 
participating interest in the block as Operator. 
                                                 
10 Source: INPEX company website 
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Despite the lack of financial support from the Japan Nation Oil Corporation11, INPEX 
conducted several drilling campaigns, the first of which clearly demonstrated the existence of 
considerable gas and condensate reserves. The geological success of the initial drilling phase 
generated great expectations: “There could be even more!”, was Mr. Ito’s reaction to the 
promising results obtained after the first finding operations. A thorough analysis and 
interpretation of seismic data prompted INPEX to organize a second campaign, during which 
further exploratory wells confirmed the presence of a huge gas and condensate field, 
subsequently called “Ichthys field”12.  
In 2007, additional wells showed a substantial increase in recoverable reserves: accurate 
evaluation estimated them at 12,8 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas and 527 million barrels of 
condensate. These encouraging numbers laid the foundations for the development of a major 
project in the Asia-Pacific LNG industry and were followed by the grant in 2009 of a Petroleum 
Retention Lease for WA-37-R block over the gas field and the concession of two production 
licenses, comprising WA-37-R and WA-51-L blocks.  
Three “mega” projects into one: the development concept 
During the exploration phase, INPEX realized several studies regarding the development 
concept of the Ichthys project. Given the location of the gas field, INPEX started to conceive a 
large LNG infrastructure that would cover the entire production chain of natural gas, from 
upstream to downstream operations. The first concern regarded the site selection for the onshore 
LNG plant; after an in-depth analysis and detailed assessment of possible alternatives, Darwin, 
in the Northern territory, was considered to be the most suitable location.  
Offshore installations would, instead, comprise a subsea production system, consisting of a 
series of production wells13, a drill center, flow lines and flexible risers. Extracted gas would 
be, then, directed to a semisubmersible central processing facility (CPF), whose advanced 
design and engineering best suited with deep sea operations. On board, liquids would be 
separated from the dried gas and then transferred by pipe to the Floating Production, Storage 
                                                 
11 Independent Administrative Institution responsible for securing energy supply to Japan.  
12 “Ichthys meant “fish” in ancient Greek and was used to refer to the significant amount of fossilized fish discovered in the 
proximity of the Western Australia. 
13 According to estimates, the extraction of gas from the offshore field would require 20 wells in the initial construction phase 
and 30 remaining wells to be drilled once the facilities would become operative. Drilling cost was estimated at $90m per 
offshore well. 
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and Offloading facility (FPSO) for further processing. After a treatment phase, condensate 
would be collected in storage tanks and moved to off-take vessels for shipment.  
The remaining gas would be transferred to the Darwin LNG plant through a 900km-pipeline. 
Onshore treatment would convert dried gas into LNG and liquefied petroleum gases (LPGs) 
and be operated by two large LNG processing trains, with an expected production capacity of 
8.4 mtpa of LNG and 1.6 mtpa of LPGs, together with 100,000 barrels of condensate per day 
at peak. Having more than LNG train would, indeed, provide greater production flexibility and 
increase security of output. Onshore facilities would also include a module offloading facility 
tasked to receive gas-processing modules, a navigation channel, a turning basin and a berthing 
pocket for the product tankers. Exhibit 10 provides an illustrative representation of the project’s 
development concept. 
THE ROAD TO THE FID 
The FEED phase and the contracting strategy 
The project planning was supported by Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) works, that were 
performed for both offshore and onshore installations from January 2009 to July 2011 and were 
contracted to AMEC and JKC Joint Venture (JKC JV)14 respectively. The main goal of the 
FEED was to obtain reasonable and transparent estimates of the project’s costs and a forecast 
of the potential technical requirements of each construction package, identifying, at the same 
time, all the implied risks. The FEED allowed the sponsors to design the contractual framework 
to be used in the following Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) phase: indeed, 
having defined draft EPC contract terms and agreed negotiating guidelines was necessary to 
solicit bids from interested contractors and organize the subsequent Invitations to Tender (ITT). 
The FEED phase was also vital as it supported INPEX to define a feasible execution schedule 
and perform a preliminary bankability analysis of the project.  
During this phase, INPEX elaborated a specific contracting strategy to be adopted for the EPC 
phase upon making the Final Investment Decision and intended to ensure reliable EPC contracts 
for the construction operations: this strategy focused on the issuance of open book tenders15 
and on the limited use of reimbursable elements in EPC agreements, as they could favour 
                                                 
14 A joint venture created by three different construction companies, JCG Corporation, KBR Inc. and Chiyoda Corporation. 
15 Public tenders aimed to encourage more bidders to join the competition.  
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potential cost escalations.16 On the contrary, INPEX maximised lump-sum contracts, that could 
help to reduce uncertainties related to the project costs. Following this approach, INPEX was 
able to conclude the negotiations and finalise the major EPC contracts: before the FID, several 
contracts were awarded to creditworthy and experienced construction companies for onshore 
and offshore facilities and for the pipeline’s development; through a complex scheme of 
contractual arrangements, the sponsors were able to better manage costs and delivery schedules 
and to efficiently allocate risks among all project participants. Exhibit 17 shows the main 
construction companies contracted for the EPC phase.   
At project completion, upstream and downstream operations and maintenance would be 
managed by INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of INPEX. 
According to the contractual terms of the O&M contract, the operating company (OC) would 
receive reimbursement of the direct costs incurred that would be recharged to the project 
sponsors. During this phase, the OC would subcontract third-parties for the provision of specific 
support and engineering services. Major replacement expenditures were expected every 15 
years, as it was the average period after which gas pipelines and storage tanks were subject to 
extraordinary maintenance and potential refurbishments. To operate on site and offshore 
installations, approximately a total of 340 workers would be required.   
Securing LNG contracts 
The high capital commitment of the project forced INPEX to identify potential LNG buyers 
and secure gas sales for the entire production phase. Having established sales agreements was, 
in fact, essential to make Ichthys financially viable and repay future debt financing.  
“We need to have reliable and stable revenues from LNG production”, Mr. Ito told Mr. Jiro 
Okada, Vice President of the Ichthys Project Division, while evaluating the terms of 
negotiations with some interested gas companies. “Yes, contracts have to be arranged on a long-
term basis.” Indeed, LNG market in the Asia-Pacific region was characterized by the dominance 
of 15 to 20 years sales agreements, with a very small percentage of shorter term arrangements.17 
As this was the norm, INPEX was able to successfully conclude the sale of the entire LNG 
volume by legally establishing Sales and Purchase Agreements (SPAs) with several energy 
                                                 
16 Indeed, unpredictability of costs could result in expenditure overruns.  
17 Despite the reduced use of shorter-term agreements, the Asian market was experiencing a relatively modest shift towards 
LNG sales to spot markets. Following this trend, INPEX did not exclude to sell part of its LNG production in the spot market 
upon expiration of the long-term contracts. 
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companies, with a contract duration of 15 years from 2017 when production would commence. 
SPAs’ details are shown in Exhibit 16.  
Given the absence of a defined natural gas market and associated pricing mechanism, all sales 
agreements were structured in the form of oil-indexed contracts18, linked to the Japan Crude 
Cocktail (JCC) reference price index19 and contained “take or pay” clauses20, that would ensure 
a constant revenue stream. Contract terms indicated that LNG would be delivered in ‘FOB’ 
shipping.21 However, negotiated prices were not disclosed.  
“High oil prices will allow us to strongly support the project cash flows and its financing”, was 
Mr. Okada’s belief by looking at the actual oil import price in Japan of $115/barrel.22 “The 
actual forecasts point to increasing extraction and liquefaction costs (Exhibit 34), but with oil 
prices at this level, I am confident that we would be able to easily sustain all project 
expenditures and obtain significant returns” – Mr. Ito added. The signing of these agreements 
was considered to be a major step in providing steady gas supply to Japan, as 70% of LNG 
production would be delivered to the Asian country, while guaranteeing, at the same time, stable 
LNG operations.  
Furthermore, INPEX planned to sell the full LPG volume and condensate in the spot markets 
of Far East and Southeast countries, where the demand for these products was projected to 
gradually increase, with a growth above the global average. These favourable trends, coupled 
with the high levels of production from Ichthys, were expected to positively contribute to the 
project economics.  
INPEX SIGNS THE FID 
“The largest, ever” 
On January 12th, 2012 Mr. Kuroda announced the final investment decision for the Ichthys 
project, with first production to be expected in 2016. This achievement represented a major 
milestone for the LNG sector and the largest investment of a Japanese company in Australia. 
With an estimated life of 40 years and a forecasted capital cost of $34 billion, the Ichthys project 
                                                 
18 The oil-indexation mechanism is shown in Exhibit 15. 
19 JCC is the weighted average monthly price of a basket of various crude oils imported into Japan. JCC usually moves in line 
with other global crude benchmarks.  
20 “Take-or-pay” arrangements require the buyers either to take the consignment of the goods contracted or to pay the supplier 
a penalty if they don’t do so.  
21 FOB shipping requires the buyer to incur all the costs related to the shipment of LNG. 
22 Source: OECD database  
 12 
was the result of a beneficial partnership between INPEX and Total SA of France, which joined 
the project in 2006 through an initial 24% participating interest, then increased to 30% in July 
2012. For Total, Ichthys had the potential to provide “a gateway to Asian gas markets”.23 Its 
relevant experience in the development of world-scale LNG infrastructures and the high credit 
rating of both companies (AA) contributed to make Ichthys possible. The sponsor group 
included also some junior LNG offtakers, which had the 4% remaining interest in the project. 
The FID arrived just after receiving the environmental approvals from the Australian 
Government, and the grant of production and pipeline licenses. Australia would benefit a lot 
from Ichthys: estimates pointed to more than $195 billion in exports, $73 billion in taxation 
revenue and to a $190 billion increase in GDP. Moreover, Ichthys would provide 10% of 
Japan’s imports, contributing to fill the ‘energy gap’ in the next decades.  
Besides its strategic importance for both Japan’s energy supply and Australia’s export capacity, 
the launch of Ichthys established several records: it was the first LNG project to be operated by 
a Japanese company; despite the global financial crisis, it secured the largest amount of project 
financing ever arranged for an energy project until then, and would imply the use of the most 
sophisticated technology for the construction of the biggest offshore facilities ever used in LNG 
projects, including the largest pipeline in the southern hemisphere.  
The project structure: a unique Special Purpose Vehicle 
As in every project finance transaction, the establishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
was necessary. However, the sponsors designed a peculiar commercial structure for the SPV: 
the ownership of the project, comprising onshore and offshore assets, was split between two 
different entities: an incorporated SPV (Ichthys LNG Pty Ltd.) and an unincorporated joint 
venture24 (UPV) were created for downstream and upstream facilities respectively, with each 
participant having the same share in both of them so as to ensure a consistent sponsorship along 
the project value chain and, therefore, a perfect alignment of interests in all the phases of 
Ichthys. The downstream SPV was established as the gas marketing entity, being responsible 
for liquefaction and LNG sales, including storage and shipping and acted as a borrower for the 
debt funds arranged through project financing. Cash available to it would be used for debt 
repayment and to fund the debt service reserve account. In addition, it could lend portions of 
                                                 
23 Source: TOTAL company website 
24 The establishment of an unincorporated joint venture for upstream operations and of an incorporated downstream entity for 
marketing operations is a common trait for large integrated petroleum projects. 
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debt to upstream participants, in proportion to their stake in the project. UJV participants were 
required to fund their contributions in accordance with agreed “cash calling” mechanisms. 
UJV partners did not provide guarantees for the project-finance debt, but could still benefit 
from a cash flow waterfall mechanism that ensured the same availability of cash to finance 
onshore and offshore operations. Indeed, the account structure established by the sponsors 
guaranteed that cash could be easily transferred between the upstream and downstream entities.   
By splitting the ownership of the project assets, several advantages could be identified: indeed, 
the UPV structure guaranteed superior flexibility in marketing operations for condensate sales 
since it would allow each UJV partner to book a part of the condensate reserves as its assets 
and market the finished petroleum products to existing clients.25 Moreover, UJV structures 
benefited from fiscal advantages, as they did not have to comply with the tax obligations 
imposed on incorporated companies. On the other hand, the creation of an incorporated SPV 
provided greater possibilities for a future expansion of the onshore installations and facilitated 
the negotiations with LNG buyers. 
Given these features, the gas produced by upstream facilities would be sold by each UJV 
member to the downstream project company that, in turn, would treat and process it to sell LNG 
to third-party offtakers according to the long-term sales agreements already signed. Revenues 
from both upstream participants and the downstream company were required to be paid into 
secured accounts.  
The Financing  
The financing of the Ichthys project was a major achievement in project finance markets: after 
a year of efforts and negotiations, the sponsors were able to close a US$20 billion loan package 
in December 2012 through a complex financial arrangement comprising limited-recourse debt 
from export credit agencies and several commercial banks, along with upfront cash. “The sound 
financials of Ichthys (Exhibit 29) and the production slate, with three products (LNG, LPG and 
condensate) from one investment helped us to obtain such a large external financing and to 
conclude an efficient transaction” – was Mr. Ito’s comment after the successful financial close. 
Besides that, the location of the project, that lowered the risk profile of the deal, and the good 
credit rating of the LNG buyers all contributed to make the project bankable and able to meet 
lenders’ cash coverage requirements (Exhibit 32). Mizuho Corporate Bank and Crédit Agricole 
                                                 
25 Source: Reuters, Project Finance international, 2016 
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Corporate & Investment Bank were appointed as lead arrangers for the overall financing 
process. 
The debt financing, all in form of senior sponsor credit facilities, broke down into: 
- $5.8 billion in direct Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) loans, with Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC)26 being the largest lender; 
- $5.4 billion in ECA-covered loans; 
- $4.8 billion in uncovered commercial bank debts from a syndicate of 24 lenders, including 
Japanese, Australian and other international commercial banks; 
- $4 billion in senior shareholders loans, provided either by commercial lenders and 
guaranteed by sponsors or provided directly by the project sponsors.27  
All loan agreements were in the same common loan facility: tenor was set at 16 years, with first 
drawdown in February 2013, while, in terms of pricing, ECA-covered and direct loans would 
pay the same margin of 220bps over LIBOR 6M with a fee of 200 bps. Commercial debt was 
priced at 240bps over LIBOR 6M throughout the entire construction phase and projected to rise 
to 375bps when production would start, with a fee in the mid-200 bps range to pay during 
construction.28 The sponsor senior loans (Exhibit 22) mirrored the financing terms of the 
commercial portion of the debt. The limited recourse nature of the debt allowed the lenders to 
have a relative margin of safety over the loans extended, with 25% of the principal repayment 
being collateralized. 
With loans totalling to $20, the remaining amount implied an equity proportion of 41,2% 
(Exhibit 20) of the overall capital structure, that was considered unusually large in project 
finance transactions, since market trends pointed to higher debt-to-equity ratios for LNG 
projects.  
In addition, sponsors had the obligation to meet certain equity requirements: besides providing 
part of the equity contributions through “early revenues” generated by the development, they 
had to inject agreed amounts of equity, funded via subordinated debt. 
Despite the limited-recourse financing, lenders could benefit from a customary debt service 
until project completion and exert a high level of control on the project operations as they could 
                                                 
26 JBIC is Japanese policy-based financial institution and export credit agency, that provides lending and guarantees in order 
to contribute to enhance the competitiveness of Japanese industries and secure important resources for the national economy’s 
development. Source: JBIC web site 
27 These loan facilities did not benefit from the sponsors’ debit service undertaking. 
28 Source: IJ Global, Project Finance & Infrastructure Journal 
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have access to the entire expected cash flow and assets of the project, both upstream and 
downstream, following the “one project – one cashflow” principle promoted by the sponsors, 
notwithstanding the split of the ownership.  
Sponsor support arrangements included also completion guarantees to lenders, debt service 
undertakings and contingent funding commitments.   
The role of the ECAs 
ECAs have been essential in securing a large financing and were instrumental to debt close. 
Their involvement in the project ensured additional debt capacity, with better financing terms, 
longer tenor and flexible schedule repayment. Indeed, ECA-backing allowed commercial banks 
to lend on a longer-term basis and to reduce the amount of capital that they were required to set 
aside to extend the loans and provide credit to the borrower. Through ECA guarantees, they 
were taking the risk of the ECA’s government and not that of the project. This, in turn, resulted 
in cheaper costs of financing and more competitive pricing. Exhibit 21 shows a typical ECA 
financing operation. 
From ECAs perspective, Ichthys was of strategic importance: the relevance of the project for 
Japan’s future energy scenario enabled JBCI to grant the largest ever direct loan to a single 
project. The need for LNG pushed also other Japanese ECAs and insurance companies to 
provide further commercial bank cover, among whom there was Nippon Export and Investment 
Insurance (NEXI). However, increasing gas demand was not the only reason for ECAs’ 
participation: given the involvement of Korean companies as subcontractors for the projects, 
Korea Trade Insurance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of Korea provided substantial 
direct lending and commercial and political risk coverage as well.  
Insurance Arrangements  
The complexity and size of Ichthys required its sponsors to accurately arrange insurance 
contracts for all the phases of the project so as to ensure an appropriate placement of capacity 
risk. During the construction and operations phase, there was all-risk coverage for property 
damage, third-party liabilities for both offshore and onshore facilities, including force majeure 
insurance and protection against any operators’ extra expense and marine operations’ risks. 
Insurance arrangements also comprised an Advance Loss of Profits insurance, covering 
potential income losses resulting from delays due to construction risks. Annual insurance fees 
would amount to roughly $1 million.  
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Conclusion 
 “This is a new beginning for INPEX in Australia!” – was everyone’s belief within the 
company. Construction at Darwin was about to start very soon and contractors were planning 
to begin operations in the following weeks. Mr. Ito was optimistic about Ichthys’ future 
development: it was expected to be one the best performing projects in the Australian LNG 
sector, with potential for further growth. The lending institutions’ willingness to provide 
financing to Ichthys showed that a project with solid financials and appropriate economic 
support features could attract considerable funding. 
However, raising concerns were made with respect to possible cost overruns and delays in the 
delivery of Ichthys, a common trait for projects of this size in the Australian gas industry, where 
problems in manufacturing processes and contract disputes have usually generated escalating 
costs and recent appreciations of the local currency against the US dollar have caused some 
projects’ costs to rise since 2009.29  
On the other hand, profitability of the project highly depended on oil market trends and 
volatility: rising crude price could sustain strong and massive cash flows, but the potential for 
significant price fluctuations could negatively affect Ichthys’ economics.   
Although there was little scepticism and some analysts called for more prudent valuations, 
Ichthys was ready to change the Australian LNG landscape. 











                                                 
29 https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NG-83.pdf. 
